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1. Introduction and motivation  
Much of the health care services are transacted within the public sector, are financed by health 
insurance, or provided by members of professions where barriers to access are high. In these situations, 
observed prices are not informative in the same way as on open markets, where willingness to pay by 
consumers is at least equal to the market price and market prices reflect the value of the resources used 
in production. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is an imperfect substitute for market valuations. It holds the 
promise of indicating to policy makers whether a health program is worth its cost.  
 
However, CBA requires a measure of valuation by consumers, which is hard to come by. For this 
reason, alternatives to CBA have been developed in health economics, notably cost effectiveness 
analysis (CEA) and cost utility analysis (CUA). These alternatives are discussed in section 2 and found 
deficient in important aspects. Section 3 is devoted to a particular challenge that health behavior seems 
to pose to the application of CBA, the often-heard quote being that consumers "do not give a trifle for 
health when healthy but are willing to spend their fortune when sick". It is shown that this does not 
necessarily reflect instability of preferences (which would render the application of CBA indeed 
difficult). Issues surrounding the measurement of true cost are discussed in section 4, while section 5 
returns to the benefits side. The human capital approach is criticized for not being compatible with 
standard microeconomics. The alternatives are Contingent Valuation and Discrete-Choice Experiments 
(DCE). The latter is argued to be superior on several grounds. A rare empirical application of CBA is 
presented in section 6 and conclusions are offered in section 7. 
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2. Alternatives to CBA as applied to health  
There are different approaches to evaluating health programs. They usually are distinguished by the 
units in which positive and negative effects of an intervention are measured. The simplest alternative is 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA). Here, the effects are measured by natural units on a one-
dimensional scale. This can either be a clinical parameter such as the lowering of blood pressure in mm 
Hg or the lengthening of life in years. CEA allows evaluating and ranking two ore more mutually 
exclusive interventions, with the intervention having the lowest cost per unit of positive effect to be 
preferred. However, as soon as there is more than one health effect, CEA cannot be used. Furthermore, 
even if an intervention is cost-effective, it fails to answer the question of whether the program “is worth 
the money”, i.e. should be implemented at all. 
Cost-Utility Analysis (CUA) goes one step further by taking the multi-dimensionality of health into 
account. CUA reflects both lengthening of life and change in health status. It uses a cardinal utility 
function defined in terms of health (but no other goods), which maps these two dimensions of health 
into a scalar index, which then can be compared to the cost of the program. The best-known and most 
frequently used index is quality-adjusted life years (QALYs).1  
To derive QALYs, all conceivable health states are evaluated on a scale from 0 (death) to 1 (perfect 
health). The other values are defined in such a way that for any number x between 0 and 1, a 
representative individual is indifferent between the following alternatives, “survive one year in a health 
state with a utility index of x” and “survive the fraction x of a year in a state of perfect health”. In this 
way, all health effects of an intervention are made comparable, permitting them to be aggregated into a 
single number, which can be interpreted as the ‘gain in QALYs’. 
The QALY concept is easy to apply. However, it has no sound decision-theoretic foundations since it is 
based on several restrictive assumptions. Preferences for health states and trade-offs against other 
objectives must be stable over the whole life cycle, there must be risk neutrality with respect to length of 
life, and preferences w.r.t. health states with durations of zero have to be equivalent (see Zweifel et al., 
2008, ch. 2.3). There are several empirical studies suggesting that the requirements of the QALY 
concept are in general violated (see Dolan, 2000 for a survey). 
If QALYs are used as a utility index in a CUA framework, the decision rule is to pick the intervention, 
which maximizes the number of QALYs for a given budget. This rule is based on two fundamental 
value judgments, 
                                                 
1  Alternative concepts are disability-adjusted life years (DALYs), see World Bank (1993), and for a detailed 
exposition Murray (1994); or healthy years equivalents (HYEs), see Mehrez and Gafni (1989). 
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(1) The welfare of the affected person enters the collective decision rule exclusively through 
QALYs gained; 
(2) It is irrelevant who experiences the increase in QALYs. 
This makes CUA not compatible with the usual welfarist position adopted in economics, viz. that 
collective decisions should be based on overall utility of the affected persons and not only health-related 
utility (see Boadway and Bruce, 1984). The use of QALYs and CUA in general may be justified if the 
health budget is fixed. However, there is empirical evidence suggesting that the distribution of QALYs 
matters, in the guise of a moderate or even strong preference in favor of the young rather than the old 
[see e.g. Johannesson and Johansson (1997a, b) for a specific case; or Schwappach (2002) for an 
overview]. In principle, it is possible to account for the distribution of QALYs in a generalized CUA 
framework. However, this requires considerably more information than a basic CUA. 
Compared to CEA, CUA has the advantage of being applicable both to medical interventions of 
different types as well as non-medical interventions because it makes effects measured on different (e.g. 
clinical) dimensions comparable by mapping them into a single utility index. It can be used to construct 
so-called ‘league tables’ of medical interventions, which have repeatedly shown that similar increases in 
QALYs can be achieved at very different costs. This type of information is useful to political decision 
makers who are responsible for allocating a fixed budget within the health care sector. 
However, CUA has its limitations, too. Besides weaknesses in its decision-theoretic foundations and its 
neglect of the distribution of QALYs among the members of society, CUA is conditional on whose 
utility function goes into the determination of QALYs. Furthermore, like CEA, CUA provides only a 
rank ordering of mutually exclusive interventions but fails to provide an answer as to the cutoff value of 
cost per QALY above which realization of a program cannot be justified. This is important as soon as 
the total amount of money to be allocated to health is not predetermined.  
In Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), both costs and benefits are measured in money, making it suitable to 
evaluate interventions occurring inside or outside the health care sector and having any health and non-
health consequences. If the money value of benefits exceeds that of cost, implementing the program is 
worthwhile. The application of this rule can be justified using the welfare economic criterion of 
‘potential Pareto-improvement’ [also called ‘Kaldor-Hicks’ criterion, see, e.g., Zweifel et al. (2008), ch. 
2.4]. 
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3. Why CBA is particularly challenging in the case of health  
The crucial feature of health is that it does not constitute a tangible stock that can be held, controlled, 
and traded [see, however, the stock formulation by Grossman (1972)]. This means individuals cannot 
sacrifice ‘health’ in exchange for something else – apart from the hesitation of most to say that they are 
consciously opting for a level of health that is below the maximum attainable. However, individuals do 
trade a (small) reduction in the probability of being healthy in the future against other objectives (that 
will be called ‘consumption’ for simplicity). Let (1 - π) denote this probability during a short period (a 
week, say). Accordingly, the probability of being in bad health is π. Let the individual use expected 
utility EU as the decision criterion, with utility derived from consumption depending on whether one is 
healthy (h) or sick (s). Therefore, expected utility is given by  
[ ] [ ](1 ) ,s s h hEU u C u Cπ π= ⋅ + −     with  [ ] [ ].h su C u C>       (1) 
Therefore, at a given level of consumption, utility in the healthy state exceeds utility in the sick state – a 
very natural assumption. Now an indifference curve in [(1 – π), C]-space can be constructed by varying 
π, Cs, and Ch while holding EU constant, resulting in the condition, 
[ ] ( ) ( ) [ ]0 1s hs s s h h h
s h
u udEU d u C dC dC d u C
C C
π π π π∂ ∂= = ⋅ + + − + −∂ ∂ .    (2) 
This can be solved for the slope of the indifference curve (setting dCs = dCh :=dC) and writing 'u  for 
marginal utilities), 
( )
[ ] [ ]
[ ] ( ) [ ] .1 ' 1 'h h s ss s h h
u C u CdC
d u C u Cπ π
−= −− + −         (3) 
This slope (the marginal rate of substitution MRS) is negative since [ ] [ ]h h s su C u C> , as stated above. 
Moreover, utility increases with consumption in both states ( )' , ' 0 .h su u >  Without further justification, 
assume MRS to be decreasing as usual, resulting in convex indifference curves (see Zweifel et al. 
[2008], ch. 2.4 for details). Now consider a sequence of T periods, in each of which there is a probability 
of  (1 – π) of being in the healthy state. It follows from the binary distribution that the expected number 
of periods in the healthy state (before a change to the sick state occurs) is ETh = 1/π. Since this is a 
monotonic transformation of (1 – π), indifference curves can be drawn in a (C, ETh)-space rather than in 
(C, 1 – π)-space without loss of generality (see figure 1). In the following, the argument will be couched 
in terms of consumption (C) and expected number of healthy periods (ETh). 
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Up to this point, the existence of a MRS between consumption and ‘health’ (more precisely, the 
expected number of healthy periods over a future comprising T periods, with hET T≤ ) has been 
established. But this MRS is nothing but the individual's marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) for more 
time in good health because it indicates how much in terms of consumption (or income) he or she is 
prepared to give up for more time in good health. According to the model presented here, MWTP is 
predicted  
(1) to depend on the initial endowment in terms of consumption and expected number of healthy 
periods [originally chances for good health (1 – π)];  
(2) to decrease when ETh approaches its maximum value of T;  
(3) to increase but at a decreasing rate when a larger gain in ETh is being considered.  
It can also be shown that (4) MWTP increases with initial consumption (or equivalently, wealth; see 
Zweifel et al. [2008], ch. 2.4 for details). 
Now, members of the medical profession and many laymen would doubt the existence of a stable 
preference field as displayed in figure 1. Indeed, human behavior often is decried as, "Not giving a trifle 
for health as long as one is healthy, but willing to spend one's entire fortune once one is sick". This 
seems to be evidence in favor of unstable preferences, with MWTP strongly state-dependent. If true, the 
argument would severely limit the usefulness of evidence with regard to WTP for policy purposes. 
However, it can be shown that the state-dependence of observed MWTP may follow from a state-
dependence of the transformation curve between C and ETu. 
In figure 1 consider the transformation curve with index h, holding for a current period in good health. 
From the origin, the curve starts with a positive slope because when (1 – π) increases, the expected 
number of healthy periods ETh increases as well, providing for healthy time that serves either to 
generate labor income (which can be used to finance consumption goods) or leisure time (which can be 
used to produce consumption services). Thus, for small values, healthy time has the character of an 
investment good, permitting to increase consumption services as well. The transformation curve reaches 
its maximum where the additional resources spent on increasing the chances of being in good health 
(and hence, expected healthy time) result in an equivalent gain in resources in terms of time available 
for work and investment in health (see Zweifel et al. [2008], ch. 3.3 for details). As is evident from 
figure 1, at the optimum (symbolized by Q*), health has turned into a consumption good, implying that 
more time spent in good health entails a sacrifice in terms of consumption. 
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Figure 1 contains a second transformation curve relating to sickness (s) during the current period. In bad 
health, one’s productivity both in the labor market and in household production is reduced for at least 
part of the planning period T. Accordingly, this transformation curve runs lower and reaches its max-
imum value ETh (and also C) sooner than its counterpart for good current health. In order to demonstrate 
that this difference rather than an instability in preference may be the source of observed state-
dependence of MWTP, two assumptions are made:  
(a) preferences are homothetic; 
(b) sickness in the current period affects the individual as a producer of future healthy time more 
strongly than as a producer of future consumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given these assumptions, the two optima Q* (good current health) and Q** (bad current health) can be 
compared as follows. When moving towards the origin on the ray 0Q*, the slope of the indifference 
curve remains the same according to assumption (a). However, the slope of the transformation curve 
must become steeper on average for assumption (b) to be satisfied. This means that the optimum Q** 
cannot possibly lie on the ray through the origin; indeed, it must lie above that ray, where the slope of 
the indifference curve is greater (in absolute value). However, this also implies that at Q**, the marginal 
rates of transformation and substitution must be larger than at Q*. In other words, the revealed MWTP 
for additional healthy time is greater if the current period is one of bad health than if it is one of good 
Figure 1: State-dependence in the production of healthy time 
C 
Q* 
0 T 
ETh 
EU EU 
EU 
Q** 
h 
s 
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health. The observed MWTP thus turns out to be state-dependent not because of any instability of 
preferences but because of the dependence of productive capabilities on current health status, which 
seems a very natural assumption. 
Conclusion 1: The observed instability of revealed marginal willingness-to-pay for health (low when 
healthy, high when ill) need not be caused by an instability of underlying preferences 
but may well be caused by the dependence of individuals’ productive capabilities on the 
current state of health. 
Thus, the argument that individuals' preferences with regard to health and health care are too fickle to 
provide a basis for policy making need not be accepted. This is not to say that measuring true MWTP 
for health is without problems, quite to the contrary. While in principle, it is possible to infer 
individuals' MWTP from the equality between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of 
transformation (and hence actual behavior) at the optimum points Q* and Q**, there are at least two 
reasons for important deviations. First, the rate of transformation is biased because of insurance 
coverage. With a coinsurance rate of 20 percent (say), the sacrifice of one Dollar’s worth of 
consumption in effect buys five times as much medical care as without insurance coverage. Thus, the 
transformation curve looks five times flatter than in figure 1 to an insured individual who considers 
using medical care. The second reason is that as soon as individuals rely on medical care, they are not 
likely to actually reach the optimum Q** (bad current health). This is due to the fact that they act under 
the influence of physicians, who pursue their own interests. To the extent that physicians are not perfect 
agents of their patients, they will misrepresent the trade-off between C and ETh and/or influence their 
patients’ MRS, both of which cause Q** to be missed. 
4. Issues with measuring true cost 
In CBA, the costs of health care programs fall in three categories. First, there are direct costs arising 
from the use of resources within the health care sector, in other sectors and by patients and their 
families. Second, there are indirect costs due to productivity changes. Third, the so-called intangible 
costs as from suffering or pain. It is both important and difficult to avoid double counting, taking into 
account only costs that are caused by the program and not incorporated in the benefit measures. If for 
instance an intervention reduces the pain of patients, intangible cost of the disease is reduced. This 
would be accounted for separately in a CUA. However, in a CBA derived from experiments (see next 
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section), these cost reductions are already incorporated in the WTP values. There are additional issues to 
bear in mind when measuring cost of health programs as part of a CBA.2 
Vantage point of the analysis 
A natural question to ask is, “Whose costs, whose benefits?” This may be society as a whole, a third-
party payer, a physician, a hospital, or a patient. Clearly, costs and benefits differ between these vantage 
points. While, e.g., travel to obtain care is clearly a cost component from the patient’s and society’s 
point of view, they do not have to be taken into account from a hospital’s point of view. Since CBA may 
serve different kinds of decision-makers, this is not a weakness but reflects the versatility of the tool. 
Direct costs 
Direct costs represent the value of all resources consumed by the intervention analyzed, including the 
neutralization of its side effects and other current or future consequences. There are two different types 
of direct costs. 
Direct health care costs include physician services, hospital services, and drugs, used. Direct non-health 
care costs accrue outside the health sector, such as care provided by family members and transportation 
costs to the hospital. In quantifying direct health care costs, it may be problematic to use readily 
available hospital or physician charges, since the health care market is not a competitive one, causing 
the charges to be a poor reflection of true (opportunity) cost (Finkler, 1982).  
Different studies explored this issue in the context of hospital fees in the United States. While there 
were large differences in the magnitude of the cost estimates obtained from the various estimation 
methods, the ranking by cost was not attended [see e.g. Cohen et al (1993); Taira et al., (2003)]. 
Therefore, failure to use true resource cost may not be too much of a problem in CEA and CUA (which 
are within health), this is not true of CBA (which pits health against other objectives). 
Indirect costs 
If the vantage point of society at large is adopted, indirect costs (i.e. productivity losses) need to be 
accounted for. They include lost work hours due to absenteeism or early retirement, impaired 
productivity at work, lost or impaired leisure time, and premature mortality. Intangible costs of pain, 
suffering, and grief are real yet very difficult to measure. Depending on the scenario description (see 
below), they are incorporated in the benefits (WTP values) of a CBA and therefore should be neglected 
in the costs of a program. 
                                                 
2 For a detailed overview of cost estimation in health-related CBA see Johannesson (1996), ch. 7; or Drummond et al. 
(2005), ch. 4. 
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Time horizon 
Choice of time horizon can importantly affect the costs of a health care intervention, which may accrue 
irregularly over time. For instance, Henderson et al. (1998) examined costs of percutaneous transluminal 
coronary angioplasty (PTCA) and coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) as a function of time. While 
after one year, the costs of CABG were substantially higher than those of PTCA, this difference was not 
statistically different anymore after five years (see Figure 2). The time horizon should be chosen in a 
way that does not bias the analysis in favor for or against the intervention considered. It should be long 
enough to capture important deferred effects (including unintended ones), amounting to a disease 
episode, a patient’s remaining life expectancy, or even several cohorts of patients or individuals as in 
the case of HIV transmitted to children. Quantitative modeling approaches may be needed to estimate 
costs and outcomes that are beyond those of officially available data. Of course, the higher the discount 
rate used, the less important are future costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Henderson et al. 1998 
Average vs. marginal cost 
Economists stress the importance of using marginal cost in evaluation because most decisions are not of 
the “on/off” type but of the “more/less” type. In that situation, economic analysis may reveal that, 
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Figure 1: Cumulative costs of percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) and 
coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) over time (confidence intervals indicated by 
the bars) 
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beyond a certain level of spending, the additional benefits are no longer worth the additional (marginal) 
cost. For example, as shown in Table 1, the average cost per desired outcome of an iterative screening 
test may appear to be quite acceptable (e.g. $2,451 per case of colorectal cancer detected at six tests per 
person), whereas the marginal cost of adding the sixth test would be an astronomical $47mn. 
Table 1 Cancer screening and detection costs with sequential guaiac tests (source: Neuhauser and Lewicki, 1975) 
No. of tests No. of cancers 
detected 
(in 000s) 
Additional 
cancers 
detected 
(in 000s) 
Total cost ($) of 
diagnosis 
Additional ($) 
cost of 
diagnosis  
Average cost ($) 
per cancer 
detected  
Marginal cost ($) 
per cancer 
detected 
1 65,947  65,947  77,511  77,511  1,175  1,175 
2 71,442  5,496  107,690  30,179  1,507  5,492 
3 71,900  0,458  130,199  22,509  1,810  49,150 
4 71,939  0,038  148,116  17,917  2,059  469,534 
5 71,942  0,003  163,141  15,024  2,268  4,724,695 
6 71,942  0,000  176,331  13,190  2,451  47,107,214 
 
Discounting 
Costs that occur in the future have less present value than costs that materialize today (since the money 
can be put to a bank e.g. to earn interest). Discounting therefore reflects the opportunity costs of capital, 
i.e. the returns that could have been achieved elsewhere. Discounting makes flows of costs and benefits 
having different time profiles comparable in terms of their present value. The Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) predicts that a project is competitive in the capital market if its expected rate of return 
Eri satisfies the condition, 
( )i f i M fEr r Er rβ= + −           (4) 
Thus, the benchmark is the so-called risk-free interest rf, usually equated to the rate of return on 
government bonds. Since returns of shares on the capital market exceed the risk-free rate on expectation 
(ErM > rf), the (share of) firm i must achieve a higher rate of return than rf if βi > 0. Now βi is the slope 
parameter in a regression of the firm’s rates of return ri on the market values rM. Usual estimates hover 
around ˆ 1iβ = . However, as soon as ˆ 1iβ < , the (share of) firm i has a risk diversification effect. Now to 
the extent that the health intervention is sponsored by the government, βi = 0 is the appropriate value, 
resulting in Eri = rf. Therefore, the rate of discount becomes equal to the interest rate on government 
bonds. However, the value of rf should refer to bonds having about the same time horizon of the health 
care intervention. A discount rate of 3 or 5 percent is typically used (Gold et al. 1996). 
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Conclusion 2: In Cost-Benefit Analysis, measuring the true resource cost poses several problems.  
  Of  particular importance are the choice of time horizon, the distinction between 
average 
  and marginal cost, and the use of a rate of discount that is in accordance with capital 
  market theory. 
5. Alternatives for measuring benefits 
To assign a money value to an improvement in length or quality of life, two entirely different concepts 
have been developed, the human-capital approach and the willingness-to-pay approach. 
Human-Capital Approach 
The human-capital approach [see e.g. Mushkin (1978)] places money weights on healthy time using 
market wage rates. Therefore, a life is valued in terms of the present value of the individual’s 
contribution to the Gross Domestic Product, which equals his or her labor income. There are several 
problems with this approach. First, wage rates should reflect marginal productivities of workers. 
However, there are often imperfections in labor markets, which cause wages to deviate from 
productivities due to discrimination by age or gender. Second, from a societal perspective, healthy time 
gained that is not sold for a wage has to be valued, too. This raises the question on how to place shadow 
prices on non-marketed resources.3 Finally and as a matter of principle, the human capital approach is 
not compatible with microeconomic theory (see e.g. Mishan, 1971). After all, it is the rest of society 
who (through the labor market and employers) values an individual, resulting in a zero value of life for 
pensioners and others who are unable to work, whereas in microeconomics, it is the individual who 
(subjectively) values consumer goods, jobs, risks, and life. Because of these economic and ethical flaws, 
we do not deem the human capital approach an appropriate method for placing money weights on health 
benefits. The main focus will therefore be on the willingness-to-pay approach. 
Willingness-to-pay Approach 
The willingness-to-pay (WTP) approach is based on the assumption that a person’s utility depends both 
on disposable income and on length and quality of life. In contrast to CUA, it does not impose 
restrictions on the utility function. Length and quality of life are elements of the vector θi, while yi 
denotes disposable income (or consumption). Thus, the utility of person i is given by 
                                                 
3  Two particular ways to attach a shadow price to healthy time are to use opportunity cost (see Klarman et al., 1968) 
or to use replacement cost (see Weisbrod, 1964). 
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( )iiii yUU ,θ= .           (5) 
Suppose that an intervention causes θ  to increase from 1iθ to 2iθ . Then the willingness to pay Zi for this 
intervention is defined by the maximum amount of money individual i would pay in order to obtain the 
intervention. This means that utility is the same in the two states, 
1 2, ,i i i i i i iU y U y Zθ θ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ,          (6) 
where [a] means “evaluated at a”.   
There are various ways to measure WTP. The main distinction is between revealed and stated 
preference methods. While revealed preference methods try to derive WTP values from actual behavior, 
stated preference methods elicit them by asking people more or less directly. In general economists 
prefer to infer WTP from actual behavior. The market price provides a lower bound for WTP because 
consumers buy a product only if their WTP exceeds or equals the price paid. However, markets for 
medical care are both influenced by health insurance and heavily regulated, causing observed price to be 
too low and estimated WTP too high as a rule.  
This leaves the possibility of measuring WTP by asking directly. On the one hand, Contingent 
Valuation confronts participants with one hypothetical scenario, reflecting the health care intervention 
to be evaluated. The only attribute that varies is price. By way of contrast, Discrete-Choice Experiments 
(DCE) present participants with a series of yes/no choices between the status quo and an alternative that 
differs with regard to several attributes, not only price. 
Revealed as well as stated preference methods have their specific pros and cons, which will be 
discussed in the following.  
 
Revealed Preference 
Inferring WTP indirectly from market data has the important advantage of being based on actual 
consumer choices involving chances for health versus money, rather than hypothetical scenarios and 
choices. Risk preferences can be inferred from actions designed to avoid risks. A well-known example 
is the choice (or avoidance) of a job that is known for its risks to life and health (examples are truck 
drivers, miners, or electricians). The basic idea is to estimate the compensation required for accepting a 
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higher risk of death from the difference in wage rates for occupations with and without an increased 
threat to life. However, everyday decisions like putting on the safety belt also reveal risk preferences. 
Yet, using revealed preference for measuring WTP has its problems as well. Wage-risk trade-offs are 
very context and job specific, and disentangling the many factors that confound the relationship between 
wage and health risk is difficult. One hardly finds two occupations that are identical except for their risk 
to life and health. Differences in wage rates also reflect differences in educational requirements, mental 
and physical demands experience, and many other characteristics of both workers and occupations.  
Furthermore, there is a fundamental concern that risk-money trade-offs may not reflect the kind of 
rational choice revealing preferences that the WTP concept is based on. Notably, there are imperfections 
in labor markets (collectively negotiated wages) and limited rationality (biased estimates of 
occupational risk; for an overview, see Viscusi [1992]). As fatal accidents are relatively rare, it is 
questionable whether those affected know the frequencies, let alone use them as a basis for their 
subjective probability estimates. Surveys among drivers indicate that most underestimate their personal 
risk relative to the frequency of accidents observed in the driver population. Another question is 
whether observed behavior actually can be interpreted as the outcome of expected utility maximization 
as required by theory. Empirical evidence (presented already by Eisner and Strotz, 1961; see also 
Starmer, 2000) indicates that when dealing with relatively small risks, individuals systematically violate 
this rule. However, the known alternatives fare no better (Hey and Orme, 1994). 
Finally it can be questioned whether persons in risky occupations are representative of the total 
population. The fact that they chose such an occupation and no other presumably reflects a basic 
preference for it, implying that the wage differential could constitute the upper limit of their 
compensation asked for bearing the increased risk. Members of that particular profession thus may have 
a special preference for risky situations (perhaps for the thrill that comes with them) that is not shared 
by the rest of the population. Conversely however, the observed wage differential marks the lower limit 
for the rest of the population because it would take a higher one to draw additional workers into their 
particular occupation. In conclusion, observed data may not be informative enough to permit estimation 
of WTP values. 
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Contingent Valuation 
The traditional alternative to the method of revealed preference is Contingent Valuation (CV)4. The CV 
method measures the value of a non-market good by directly asking individuals how much the good 
(with attributes usually fixed) is worth to them. Typically the survey begins by giving some background 
information to respondents on the good in question. Next, they are told the way the money would be 
collected to finance the good. Finally, respondents are asked about their WTP and possibly upper and 
lower bounds. Since the mid-1970s, CV has also been applied to health care, resulting in rapid growth 
of the number of CV studies published.5  
Nevertheless, the CV method in health economics is still reluctantly used, for two main reasons. First, 
there are conceptual issues. The results of CV are criticized for lacking validity, since they depend 
heavily on the choice of the elicitation and estimation method. Indeed, both continuous and discrete CV 
formats are used, which vary in their familiarity to respondents and in their potential for biasing WTP 
values (Donaldson et al., 1998; Johannesson, 1996; Mitchell and Carson, 1989, Nocera et al., 2002).  
The two main approaches to elicit WTP values by using a continuous CV format are open-ended 
questions and the payment card format. In the open-ended variant, individuals are directly asked to 
indicate their maximum WTP. As this may be too demanding (see e.g. Johannesson et al., 1991), the 
payment card variant confronts respondents with an ordered sequence of bids, with respondents 
indicating the maximum acceptable bid. In the discrete CV format, closed-ended techniques are 
prevalent. Here, respondents are only asked whether or not they would pay a single price out of a range. 
By varying the price in different subsamples, the proportion of respondents who are willing to pay the 
price can be calculated, and by multiplying this proportion by the number of respondents, a demand 
curve for the good can be estimated. Closed-ended techniques thus attempt to create a situation familiar 
to respondents by asking just yes-or-no questions.  
The question of whether open-ended or closed-ended techniques should be preferred in CV studies is 
still an unsettled issue. More importantly, however, the CV approach suffers from its susceptibility to 
bias, in particular of the following types.6 
                                                 
4 For an overview of more than one hundred CV studies, see Cummings et al. (1986) and Mitchell and Carson (1989). 
5 Klose (1999) or Smith (2003) present overviews of the CVM with respect to health economics. More recent examples are  
Shackley and Donaldson (2002), Nocera et al. (2003), Dranitsaris et al. (2004). 
6 For a comprehensive overview of possible sources of bias in CV studies, see Mitchell and Carson (1989). 
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• Bias caused by reference values and the ordering of questions: CV is prone to so called 
‘anchoring’ effects. Respondents indicate their WTP relative to some reference value rather than 
their own value. For example, in the payment card format, stated WTP frequently depends on the 
starting point (starting point bias). When several projects are presented at a time, the answer to 
the first question can influence all the following ones (question order bias, see Boyle et al., 
1996). 
• Sensitivity to wording of questions: The results of CV studies are very sensitive to the wording 
of the questions. For instance, the allocation of property rights  (ownership bias) or the payment 
vehicle used can affect WTP values. At an even more basic level, there is the risk that 
respondents perceive the presented good or program quite differently from what investigators 
intended. 
• Attitude towards the object of investigation: When applying the closed-ended technique, there is 
the danger of ‘yea-saying’. To express their general agreement with the object of investigation, 
respondents accept prices in excess of their true WTP (see Blamey et al., 1999). 
Considering in addition the general problems associated with interview studies,7 it seems doubtful that 
reliable WTP measurement can be obtained from CV studies. Nevertheless, this method has yielded 
theoretically plausible results when applied to health care (see e.g. Klose, 1999). Specifically, 
individuals with high incomes have been found to have a higher WTP than others. Moreover, measured 
WTP increases with the quantity of health services offered by a program. 
However, external validity of stated WTP derived from CV studies in health care has not been 
established because WTP values differ substantially with regard to the elicitation technique and 
estimation method used. WTP values from discrete CV methods usually are much higher than those 
from PC formats (see e.g. Nocera et al. [2003], ch. 8.2) noted differences in a magnitude of up to 500 
percent]. This is a problem since WTP values determine the absolute magnitude of welfare estimates 
and hence the outcome of a CBA [Boyle et al. (1996); Ready et al. (1996); Welsh and Poe (1998)].  
                                                 
7 In the health care field the following problems occur in surveys. People may not be able to deal with small probabilities, 
they may emotionally reject the questions, they may insufficiently be motivated to answer the questions because of the 
hypothetical character of the survey, and they may behave strategically (see Zweifel et al., 2008, ch. 2.4 for more details). 
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Discrete-Choice Experiments 
Discrete-Choice experiments (DCE) are a variant of conjoint analysis, which was developed in 
psychology in the late 1960s (see Luce and Tukey, 1964). This method attempts to explain and predict 
consumers’ behavior on the basis of their preferences for the attributes of a good. It is based on the New 
Demand Theory (see Lancaster, 1966), which defines preferences in terms of attributes rather than 
quantities of goods. Respondents in the survey then simply have to choose between programs differing 
in various attributes. In contradistinction to the CV approach, the status quo and the hypothetical 
alternative differ with regard to several or all attributes rather than price only. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, DCEs have been applied in transport economics and more recently, to 
environmental economics (see e.g. Hensher, 1997; Bennet and Blamey, 2001). In the mid-1990s, the 
method was implemented in health economics as well (Ryan, 1995; Ryan and Hughes, 1997). In the 
meantime, quite a few DCE studies have been conducted [see Ryan and Gerard (2003) for a first 
overview]. 
The behavioral assumption is that rational individuals will always choose the alternative with the higher 
level of (expected) utility. According to random utility theory (Manski, 1977; McFadden, 2001), the 
decision-making process within a DCE can thus be seen as a comparison of induced utilities, ijV ,  
),,,,( ijiijjij sypavV ε=           (7) 
Here, )(⋅v  represents the indirect utility function of individual i  for a good j  described by a vector of 
attributes ja  and a price denoted by jp . The income of individual i  is iy , the socioeconomic 
characteristics are denoted by is , and the error term, by ijε . Given an additive error term, the individual 
will choose alternative j  over alternative l  if:  
( ) ( ) .,,,,,, iliillijiijj sypawsypaw εε +≥+         (8) 
Here, )(⋅w  is the deterministic component of the utility that can be estimated, while the error terms 
reflect unobservable factors that vary between individuals and alternatives. The utility function ( )w ⋅  can 
be inferred from observed choices by assuming that the probability ijP  of choosing alternative j  over 
l , given the vector of attributes. The probability of this occurring is assumed to equal the difference in 
utilities, and therefore 
].),,,(),,,([ Prob iilliijjijilij sypawsypawP −≤−= εε       (9) 
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The assumption thus amounts to the probability of the noise ( )il jlε ε−  being dominated by the 
systematic difference of utilities [w(·) – w(·)]. The marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between two 
attributes k and m is given by the ratio of their marginal utilities, 
mj
kj
av
av
MRS ∂∂
∂∂−=
/
/
: .           (10) 
The MRS shows the subjective importance of attribute k relative to attribute m. If the m-th attribute is 
price (and hence the negative of disposable income net of price), MRS indicates the marginal WTP for 
attribute k. Therefore, relating back to equation (6), one has 
( ) ( )2 1 2 1 1 2 1/, , ,/ ii i i i i i i i i i i i i ii
vU y Z U y U y MRS
v y
θθ θ θ θ θ θ θ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− = − − ⋅ = − − ⋅⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ .   (11) 
The model defined by eqs. (7) to (10) is usually estimated by logit and probit techniques, depending on 
the assumption being made on the distribution of the error terms. For a more detailed explanation of 
discrete choice models and their application, see Louviere et al. (2000) or Train (2003). 
A DCE therefore amounts to tracing out an indifference curve in attribute space, with the status quo 
defining the  reference point. A preferred combination of attributes must lie above the indifference curve 
(or surface, respectively in the case of more than two attributes), a rejected one, below. Through 
repeated choices, the indifference locus can be interpolated. 
An important advantage of DCE over CV is due to the fact that respondents tend to evaluate all 
attributes of a program rather than focusing on price only. This makes DCE less susceptible to strategic 
behavior and other biases. Moreover, being based on an estimated utility function in attribute space, the 
results of a DCE can be used to determine WTP for any program that has the same set of attributes. 
However, being hypothetical, DCE are subject to the criticism that they may fail to elicit reliable and 
valid WTP values. Outside health, Louviere and Woodsworth (1983) have presented evidence 
suggesting that DCE can be used to explain modal choice in transportation, while Ghosh (1986) has 
found that they contribute to explaining the choice of a shopping mall. To this day, few studies have 
investigated the validity and reliability of DCE in the health care field. However, first results obtained 
by Bryan et al. (2000), Ryan et al. (1998); Telser and Zweifel (2002); Zweifel et al. (2006), and Telser 
and Zweifel (2007) indicate that DCE may be a valid and reliable approach to WTP measurement in the 
case of health as well. 
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Conclusion 3: The main alternatives are contingent valuation and Discrete-Choice Experiments when it 
comes to use stated rather than revealed preference for estimating benefits. The latter has 
important advantages, notably less susceptibility to a member of biases and greater 
similarity to actual decision-making situations. 
6. Empirical example 
Even if there are many papers in health care incorporating the term “cost-benefit analysis” in their title, 
only few CBAs were conducted in this area until now. Indeed, the label CBA is used in a very imprecise 
way in the health care literature. Most of the published so-called CBAs are not full economic 
evaluations but rather costing studies where cost savings due to a health care intervention are treated as 
benefits. However, these cost savings constitute a lower bound of a health program’s benefits at best. 
This misinterpretation leads to only programs that exhibit cost savings to be recommended whereas a 
true CBA may suggest even a program with higher costs to be worthwhile if it generates positive net 
benefits. According to Zarnke et al. (1997), only about 30 percent of all studies labeled CBAs valued 
health outcomes in money units. Since most of these used a human capital approach to value health 
outcomes, only about 10percent of alleged CBA studies thus would meet the standards of cost-benefit 
analysis. 
Moreover, even if outcomes of a program are valued in money units, they usually are not compared to 
cost. Most of the WTP studies are feasibility or pilot studies focusing on methodological issues but not 
on comparing cost to benefits (Drummond et al., 2004). Therefore, in the following we will present one 
particular CBA as an example of a full economic evaluation. 
Nocera et al. (2002 and 2003) conducted a CBA of three programs against Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) 
for Switzerland. First, the program ‘care’ tries to ease some of the strain on informal caregivers, which 
provide the bulk of long-term care to people suffering from AD. To elicit WTP for ‘care’, a scenario 
was built in which informal caregivers receive training in caring for demented patients. Additionally, 
they had the possibility to engage a professional nurse for a few weeks per year for free. Respondents 
were asked whether they would be willing to pay higher income taxes for such care program to be 
implemented. 
Second, the program ‘diagnosis’ focused on an early detection of AD. While no current therapy can 
reverse the progressive cognitive decline caused by AD, several pharmacological and psychosocial 
treatments exist which may delay the proceeding of the illness (Small et al., 1997; Mayeux and Sano, 
1999). For these treatments to be effective, an early diagnosis of AD is important (Callahan et al., 1995). 
However, diagnosing AD is a relatively difficult task since there is still no validated test available. 
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Currently, a first diagnostic tool are screening interviews, which inquire into personal details, family 
contact, and health state. Additionally, short quantified screenings of cognitive function such as the 
Mini-Mental State Examination (see Folstein et al., 1975) is used. If there are signs of dementia, a more 
comprehensive neuropsychological assessment conducted by specialists is needed (Small et al., 1997). 
To elicit WTP for ‘diagnosis’, Nocera et al. (2003, ch.2) designed a scenario consisting of a routine 
dementia screening test, which is currently not reimbursed by Swiss sickness funds. Therefore, 
respondents were asked whether they would be willing to pay a higher health insurance premium for 
such a program to be included in the list of benefits. 
Third, the program ‘research’ focused on research into curing AD. Intensive research all over the world 
has led to an increasing understanding of the primary factors causing AD [see e.g., Vassar et al. (1999)]. 
But despite these advances, there exists no causal therapy for AD to date. The scenario asked 
respondents for their WTP to intensify research on AD at Swiss universities financed with tax money. 
To elicit WTP values for these AD programs, different elicitation and estimation techniques were 
applied within a CV study. One aim was to analyze methodological problems in applying the CV 
method to measure people’s values for the outcome of health programs. As expected, there were big 
differences in WTP values according to the elicitation technique used (see Table 2, column 3). 
After eliciting WTP values, Nocera et al. (2003, ch. 6) additionally investigated whether the three 
programs against AD should be implemented from a societal point of view. Therefore, the costs of the 
three programs were estimated. In the case of the program ‘care’, the cost per AD patient (consisting of 
a two-day course for informal caregivers and the hiring of a professional nurse for four weeks) sum up 
to about CHF 9,300 per year (1 CHF equals some $0.84 at 2007 exchange rates). In Switzerland, 32,000 
AD patients are cared for by informal caregivers at patients’ homes. Therefore, if all of these patients 
were to take advantage of the care program, maximum possible costs of CHF 298 mn. would arise. 
These costs were then compared to estimated benefits, calculated by multiplying elicited WTP values 
with the number of the Swiss population of 18 years and older (see Table 2). 
Table 2 CBA of the programs against Alzheimer’s Disease in Switzerland 
Program Maximum Cost 
(millions CHF p.a.) 
Total WTP 
(millions CHF p.a.) 
Net Benefit 
(millions CHF p.a.) 
Care 298 319–1568 21–1270 
Diagnosis 175 17–919 −158–774 
Research 561 561–1056 0–495 
Source: Nocera et al. (2003, ch. 6). 
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While the choice of the elicitation technique affects results in a substantial way, net benefits for the 
program ‘care’ are always positive. Therefore, from a societal point of view, the implementation of this 
program can be recommended since it generates more benefit than cost. The same is true for the 
program ‘research’, while the program ‘diagnosis’ can be recommended under some circumstances 
only. In a pessimistic scenario, it is possible that cost are higher than benefits resulting in a net benefit 
of  
CHF –158 mn. per year. 
Conclusion 4: In an empirical application of Cost-Benefit Analysis, one finds programs ‘care’ and   
  ‘research’ (but not ‘diagnosis’) to be worth the money for dealing with Alzheimer’s  
  disease. 
7. Conclusion and outlook 
Microeconomic theory predicts that consumers optimize the ratio of marginal utility to price or marginal 
cost. Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is nothing but the attempt of implementing this rule for goods and 
services that are not marketable, such as public health programs. Since (marginal) utility is difficult to 
measure, health economists have developed Cost Effectiveness (CEA) and Cost Utility analysis (CUA) 
to skirt this difficulty. However, these alternatives to CBA have the disadvantage of failing to inform 
policy makers whether a public program is worth its money, possibly even at the price of an expansion 
of the budget devoted to health.  
 
An important recent innovation in CBA is the experimental estimation of utility in the guise of marginal 
willingness to pay, which makes benefits commensurable with cost. This contribution argues that the 
conventional Contingent Valuation (CV) approach frequently is too prone to biases of several types to 
be worthwhile. Rather, it proposes Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE, a variant of what is known as 
conjoint analysis in the marketing literature) as the tool of choice. In a DCE, all relevant attributes of the 
program are varied simultaneously, among them its price (usually in terms of a changed contribution to 
health insurance or to the public budget). Since an actual CBA using DCE evidence does not seem to 
have been performed by the time of writing (2007), the contribution presents a study based on CV in 
spite of the reservations stated above.  
 
But even with all the recent progress in measuring the benefits side of CBA, there are at least two issues 
that need to be addressed in the future. The first concerns the modeling of the decision-making situation 
facing individuals in the experiment. Invariably, CBA (but also CEA and CUA) scenarios have been 
depicted as one-period, one-shot problems. However, individuals may be aware that their decisions 
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today affect the range of choices open to them  (and possibly even their preferences!) later on. If true, 
this would call for a dynamic modeling approach that spells out the restrictions defining an optimal 
control path over time. The second issue is distributional. Implicitly, CBA gives equal distributional 
weight to all individuals affected by a program. The problem of course is to weigh benefits (and 
possibly costs) according to some social welfare function. Fortunately, DCE are able to provide 
estimates of these weights as well. After all, they can also be used to infer the willingness to pay of 
citizens to let some other members of society benefit from a public program (and to burden them with 
its cost).  
 
In sum, refining CBA for health especially using experimental evidence is an exciting field of future 
research. Apart from its scientific challenges, such an endeavor has great potential value in guiding 
policy makers in their decisions regarding the allocation and distribution of resources devoted to health 
– always in competition with other objectives they and their constituencies may pursue. 
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